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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation and Policy 
at the International Hellenic University.  
Power of Siberia (POS) is a pipeline of hydrocarbons that will deliver natural gas from Siberia to 
China as expected in December 2019. Current dissertation attempts to foresee the 
redistribution of power in Northeast Asia regarding energy security, economy and politics as a 
tool of energy diplomacy. State of Art is developed in Chapter 1 and illustrates a discussion about 
the viability of POS and on the foregoing the Sino-Russian approach to POS in relation with POS 
future expansion and energy security goals of Northeast Asia. Afterwards, in Chapter 2 follows 
the analysis of theoretical background and the method of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis that is 
going to be implemented to geopolitical factor Power of Siberia with aim to detect the 
redistribution of power. Afterwards, Geopolitical system is illustrated and sub-systems are 
defined as: China-ROK-DPRK, Japan, Russia-China and Russia-Kazakhstan-Mongolia-China. 
Geopolitical pillars selected are economy and politics.  
In Chapter 3 a deeper analysis is performed and geopolitical indicators are calculated for each 
sub-system. A composite weighted indicator of economy is formed from natural gas balance of 
trade, Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) and Total Final Consumption (TFC), after 
normalization. In the field of politics, geopolitical indicator is related to policy documents 
published from ministries of Energy and Foreign Affairs, signed agreements and Memorandums 
of Understanding (MoU). Then an overall composite factor is formed by combination of 
indicators of economy and politics. In Chapter 4 the geopolitical model is produced with main 
findings that redistribution of power affects more the sub-system Russia-Kazakhstan-Mongolia-
China. In Chapter 5 an attempt is made to develop geostrategic synthesis with suggestions for 
countries members of sub-systems and finally Chapter 6 comprises conclusions and suggestions 
for future research.  
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Introduction  
 
The growing demand for energy in the Northeast Asian countries in combination with 
the inflow of foreign capitals in the energy sector, and hence, are the main causes that 
enable Russia Federation thanks to its strategic location to reexamine its energy policy 
towards Siberia and Far East (Mohapatra, 2018; Kumar & Chatnani, 2018). Therefore, 
with reference to enormous amount of Russia's energy reserves, the aim of the 
research is to analyze the reallocation of power in the geopolitical complex of 
Northeast Asia, through the context of a mega infrastructure pipeline such as Power 
of Siberia pipeline. This includes the study of: a) Northeast Asia’s energy security, 
economy plus the key issue of energy security b) the strategic, economical and 
geopolitical importance of the geopolitical complex of Northeast Asia, in terms of 
energy and politics and c) effects of energy diplomacy in the geopolitical complex of 
North East Asia. 
The geographical complex of Northeast Asia has become the center of global energy 
demand and witnessed a rising level of import dependence, mainly driven by China's 
transformation into the world’s largest energy consumer. Thus, energy security is vital 
and growing natural gas trade between states (sellers and buyers) can lead nations to 
cooperate and to establish long-term political and economic relationships which in 
turn will go a long way toward stabilizing the region (Bo & Ku, 2015, pp. 192-209). 
For a global political and economic power like China, where the demand is rising and 
the necessity for continuous long-term supply is vital, energy security is inextricable 
from national security and is therefore of the utmost importance. In this framework, 
under the presidency of Chinese President Xi Jinping China has begun a large-scale 
push to achieve a shift from coal-fired power to gas so as to reduce smog-creating 
emissions of particulate matter and SOx (Gazprom, 2018). China has entered in 
geographical complex of Northeast Asia with a predominantly geo-economic strategy 
for boosting trade affairs, securing and protecting energy supplies, and building new 
cross border infrastructure (Chen & Fakhmiddin, 2018). 
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Moreover, China eventually will become the largest natural gas importing country in 
the world as a leader in emerging Asian gas market (Gas Market Report, 2018).  Import 
of gas from Russian sources reduces the reliance for China on Malacca Strait and in 
the same time ensures energy security against any other transportation and sudden 
political changes and reforms (Kumar & Chatnani, 2018).  
On the other hand, Russia is the world leading country in terms of reserves (23% of 
the world reserves) and annual production of natural gas (Federation, 2009). At this 
moment there is no a signiﬁcant upstream challenge for Russian gas, which enables 
the expansion of production and exports in the longer-term (Vatansever, 2017). 
Russia–EU institutional difference concerning the multidirectional and asymmetrical 
way of the institutional changes that are in progress in Russia and the EU related to 
gas market (Shadrina, 2014) in combination with Ukraine crisis and sanctions imposed 
has accelerated Russia's gas export diversiﬁcation. 
As a consequence, Russian pivot to Asia represents the transformation of its role in 
order to achieve access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing 
the United States and enhancing multi-polarity (Korolev, 2016). Moreover, as part of 
Russian 2030 Energy Strategy, Moscow wishes to diversify as much of its natural gas 
sales to Asia and explore deeply Northeast Asian market with the expectation of 
development of gas production in the Eastern Siberia and Far East to almost 132-152 
billion cubic meters (Ministry of Energy of Russian Federation, 2010).  
China and Russia have gradually strengthened their relationship over the past quarter-
century so China-Russia energy cooperation is even of strategic significance for both 
sides. In May 2014, just a few months after the Russia conflict with the West over 
Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed 
about the enforcement of cooperation between Russia and China.  
As a successful result of these talks in the upper level, the energy companies from two 
countries, Russia’s top gas producer Gazprom and state-owned China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), signed the China and Russia Purchase and Sales 
Contract on East Route Gas Project, a 30-year gas supply agreement starting from 
2018, that worth approximately $400 billion (Anishchuk, 2014). 
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The agreement provides for gas deliveries to China in the amount of 38 billion cubic 
meters per year. Subsequently, this fostering cooperation led to a memorandum of 
understanding for the project of pipeline gas supplies to China from Russia’s Far East 
and furthermore to an MoU on underground gas storage and gas-fired power 
generation in China between Gazprom and CNPC (Gazprom, 2018). It is obvious that 
China-Russia East Route Gas Project Cooperation was a milestone for the opening of 
an enormous new market in the post-Soviet era. 
As part of the Eastern Gas Program, Gazprom is implementing Russia’s most aspiring, 
expensive and geopolitically demanding energy project since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, representing a $55bn bet on uncharted territory (Foy, 2017). Finally, 
discussions on gas deal are being held over a second, parallel western route pipeline 
with equivalent capacity, known as Power of Siberia 2 (RT, 2017). 
The POS pipeline will pass through five regions of Russia, including Irkutsk Region, 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Amur Region, the Jewish Autonomous Region and 
Khabarovsk Region. The new infrastructure will transfer gas from Irkutsk and Yakutia 
production centers to Far East and China consumers. The total length of POS will 
comprise about 4 000 km and the design capacity upon technical specifications is 
going to reach 38 bcm (Gazprom export, 2018). This project will allow Gazprom to 
provide gas supplies to domestic consumers in Russia’s far east and start delivering 
pipeline gas to the extensive and fast-growing Chinese market.  
POS natural gas pipeline is completed by 95.5 per cent (%), equivalent to 1,954 km, 
that represent the built of the linear section running from the Chayandinskoye field 
(Yakutia) to Blagoveshchensk situated in Chinese border in the Amur Region. 
Moreover, it is planned to build a section linking Chayanda with the Kovyktinskoye 
field in Irkutsk Region (estimation 800 km pipeline) and a section from Svobodny 
in Amur Region to Khabarovsk (estimation 1000 km) as it is shown in Figure 1. 
This will link the POS to Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas transmission system 
(Gazprom, 2018). The operations that are planned for 2019 include pipeline tests, 
installation of power supply, communications and telemetry systems, and finally start-
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up and commissioning under schedule that gas supplies will start in December 2019 
(Gazprom, 2018).  
Once the world’s biggest energy reserve and the world’s biggest producer are 
connected by this umbilical cord (Russia-China), oncoming situation could have 
economic and political impacts that Europe and USA never foresaw till now (Twisdale, 
2018). At this moment, a Sino-Russian energy alliance appears to be possible, but to 
what extent and for how long remains to be seen (Scanlan-Duro, 2018) so the final 
transformation of the geopolitical complex of Northeast Asia should be proceeded 
under deeper analysis.  
 
Figure 1: Power of Siberia pipeline (Source: Gazprom) 
The geographical complex as it was stated before is related to Northeast Asia 
geographical territory which includes: Russian Federation, China, Mongolia, North 
Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao (Ecyclopaedia Britannica, 
2018). Therefore it includes the bulk of Siberia and the northeastern edges of the 
continent, then East Asia, including the continental part of the Russian Far East region 
of Siberia, the East Asian islands, Korean peninsula and finally eastern and 
northeastern China (One World Nations Online, 2017). 
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1. State of Art  
 
Firstly, a discussion about the viability of POS is developed and on the foregoing Sino-
Russian approach to POS is presented in relation to POS future expansion and energy 
security goals.  
 
1.1 Sustainability of Power of Siberia pipeline  
 
As Johnston and Stromquist (2014) estimate, in the case of resurgence of liberalization 
activities in Russia, the opportunities for Russia-China energy partnerships to be 
developed would be ideal thus the completion and expansion of Power of Siberia 
pipeline would be more certain and so would be the sustainability of this megaproject.  
Moreover, Aris (2018) underlines that Russia’s hybrid economic model adopted by 
Putin enables the security over biggest state sponsored projects, such as Power of 
Siberia which is controlled by state development bank Vnesheconom-bank (VEB). 
Sidortsov et al (2016) refer that Power of Siberia megaproject in terms of sustainability 
should definitely take into consideration the purview of Environmental Review. In 
addition, there is an ambiguity about the sustainability goal due to complexity, the 
high stakes, the geopolitical outcome of a failure to execute and the handling of 
governing risk with regard to indigenous population.  
In order to develop and expand the gas production in Russia’s East Siberia 
geographical area, investment and technology form the main two drivers required, 
especially coming from Japan and Korea. Moreover, a lot of discussion is going on 
about the viability and the return of investment (ROI) of Power of Siberia pipeline. 
Shortage of capital is a serious problem which Russia is attempting to solve through 
closer cooperation with China (Shadrina, 2014). Shoichi et al (2017) doubt about the 
success of Sino-Russian cooperation and the increase of Russian influence in the 
geographical complex of Northeast Asia because it is under high uncertainty due to 
insufficient infrastructure, the expansion of U.S shale gas revolution, the liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) factor, the Chinese perspective of importing natural gas from Central 
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Asia (Turkmenistan) and finally the decisive role of China as the only growing energy 
market in Northeast Asia. The construction of a fleet of LNG transport ships and 
terminals in the South Korea and Japan would enhance the revision on U.S LNG 
exports thus could be a threat for the success and viability of Power of Siberia 
megaproject (Kamphausen, et al., 2018).  
At this moment, one of the most serious concernments for Gazprom is the big 
pressure coming from international gas market dynamic behavior, EU Regulation and 
of course Ukrainian crisis that can affect its liquidity. Capital costs for exploration in 
Yakutia are estimated at $70 billion in capital cost plus the transportation and 
operational costs of Power of Siberia. Additionally, instead of receiving a pre-payment 
from China so as to construct the new infrastructure, Gazprom started the whole 
project with own capital expenditure so there is a question about the final economic 
gain for Gazprom (Belyi & Goldthau, 2015).  
 
1.2 The Sino-Russian interaction concerning Power of Siberia  
 
Western sanctions imposed in 2014 for Russia’s behavior in Ukraine were a catalyst 
that accelerated Russia’s diversification among Asian energy buyers and primarily 
China. Russia’s initial turn to the East as Skalamera (2017) underlines, is mainly related 
to the stagnation of European energy market, to the development of new fields to 
Eastern Siberia and the price tag by which China has the chance to gain greater equity 
stakes in the Russian upstream than in the past. Russian Energy Strategy to 2035 as 
Mehdiyeva (2017) argues, figures the attempt of Moscow first of all to apply import 
substitution measures as to secure energy sector from others sanctions and secondly 
to diversify to East and primarily to China. 
Furthermore, Røseth (2017) mentions that Russia’s energy policy has been 
transformed from mostly threat-driven, tactical and ad-hoc to a qualitative strategic 
partnership policy level. The size of bilateral deals, the win-win approach seeking 
Chinese investments are basic factors of this changing policy. In this context, Power of 
Siberia allows to Moscow a developing dependency and in the same time encourages 
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new energy projects with China. On the other hand, China is less exposed to 
vulnerability on Russian gas since China has the flexibility to shift to alternative 
sources. Also, importing natural gas via pipeline give the advantage to lessen China’s 
“Malacca dilemma” and avoid interventions from other countries to blockade Chinese 
energy imports of LNG, oil at maritime checkpoints (Koch-Weser & Murray, 2014). 
It is clear that Sino-Russian successful cooperation as per energy resources is 
characterized by China’s economic growth, urgent need of diversify China’s imports, 
the need of Russian’s companies to diversify away from western changing strategy 
orientation to blue ocean (Asian markets – China) and finally Russia’s reinforcement 
strategy of Far East regions of Russia (Kumar & Chatnani, 2018). Just recently 
Sandalow et al (2018) support that China as an awakening giant looking for blue skies 
shapes global markets, expects a lot from the construction of Power of Siberia because 
POS will constitute a big change in China’s natural gas supply. Full capacity of imported 
Russian natural gas will be reached in the mid-2020s. Till then, LNG imports will 
continue to prevail.  
The gas supplies for the Power of Siberia as Carlson (2018) demonstrates, will come 
from gas fields in Eastern Siberia, which Russia can at this moment supply only to Asian 
countries as they still remain unconnected by pipeline to European markets. This gives 
Russia the choice of bargaining leverage from better position. Russia’s gas 
transportation network (Unified Gas Supply System, UGSS) nowadays is the biggest in 
the world. As Mitrova (2014) estimates, Asian pipeline gas exports are fully dependent 
on Gazprom successful construction and set in operation of mega project Power of 
Siberia, or on the other hand unsuccessful deal with China (alternative suppliers of 
LNG and piped gas in the market replacing Gazprom or promotion of alternative 
sources of energy instead of gas). 
In addition, the fast-growing Asian gas demand in contradiction to slower European 
gas demand was a decisive motive for Gazprom to turn to Asia as a chance to diversify 
its customer base and to develop east region of Siberia (Belyi & Goldthau, 2015). 
Underdevelopment in eastern regions of Russia plus the EU tendency to reduce oil 
and gas dependence on Russia as a result of annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian 
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crisis pushed Russia to look to the east. Moreover, Skalamera (2014) argues that the 
emergence of shale gas and friction with Europe, the equity stakes dilemma, the 
domestic budgetary troubles pushed Russia to cooperate with China who has already 
predicted a gas shortage in next years, domestic imperatives, the enforcement of 
energy security and finally wants to achieve serenity all over the world. As China’s gas 
imports are increasing the first delivery of Russian natural gas from Power of Siberia 
is planned to start on December 20, 2019 (Gazprom, 2018). 
Sino-Russian gas exchange is a part of a broader diversification strategy with focus to 
securitize supply of gas to China and to guarantee a demand for Russia by diversify its 
exports markets. Russia’s border with China is 4.209 km long thus Østevik & Kuhrt 
(2018) claim that cross-border trade and engagement have revealed until now the 
enormous asymmetry between underdeveloped and underpopulated eastern regions 
of Russia and the economical booming and overpopulated Chinese territory on the 
other side. This is one main reason to explain and understand the observed Russia’s 
pivot to the East.  
 
1.3 The future extension of the project and energy security goals  
 
Spykman (1944) developed that geography plus natural resources are the primary 
geographical characteristics that affect power therefore political leadership of states 
must take under consideration specific factors that control power. Universal map thus 
the exact position of states is the primary base of a vigorous geopolitical analysis 
(Spykman, 1944). Northeast Asian Leaders during 4th Eastern Economic Forum held 
on September 2018 in Vladivostoc showed their warm willingness to support efforts 
for strong regional energy integration as a tool to eliminate rising protectionism 
(Rodova, et al., 2018).  
Power of Siberia interactions to Mongolia as Dierkes & Jargalsaikhan (2018) develop 
focus on Mongolia’s geographical location between two giant powers, Russia and 
China.  Mongolia can be described as isolated from Central Asia and Europe and more 
proximate to Northeast Asia geographical complex as it can become a transit country 
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according gas delivery from East Siberia to China. Sino-Russian attitude towards 
Mongolia is characterized by either financing projects (China) or either trying to 
enhance local economies and to preserve lower transit risks (Russia) (Jargalsaikhan, 
2018). As Power of Siberia bypasses at this moment Mongolia, security of demand 
describes Mongolia’s energy security policy upon Sustainable Development Vision up 
to 2030 towards the perspective of being strategic influencer (Kong & Ku, 2015). A gas 
pipeline across Mongolia corresponds firstly to the shortest itinerary to China and 
secondly to Mongolia’s deep willingness to become a major economic corridor as a 
transit country between Russia and China in the geographical complex of Northeast 
Asia.  
Under the emerging scheme of Belt and Road initiative, Kazakhstan is one of the main 
sources of oil and gas imports of China thus as a transit corridor affects energy security 
of China (Teng, 2017). As Kazakhstan’s economy is primarily based on hydrocarbon 
exports, energy security is attached to energy demand. The economic plan of 
Kazakhstan to ameliorate connectivity to China and neighbors under the program 
Nurly Zhol, the estimated doubled increase of Kazakhstan’s natural gas exports to 
China in 2019 could fill the import gap for China till the first delivery of natural gas via 
Power of Siberia pipeline (Bisenov, 2018).  
After the triple disaster occurred in 2011 (earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima’s 
nuclear accident), energy security for Japan is a topic on fire. Japan’s Strategic Energy 
Plan (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2018) underlines vulnerability of 
supply-demand structure so fundamental priority is the stable supply and the 
amelioration of its efficiency realizing lower cost of energy supply. Japan remains the 
world’s biggest consumer of LNG, so the project of extension of Power of Siberia to 
Korea from Weihai to Inchon may affect Japan’s energy security strategy for next 
decade. Core energy interest of Japan relies on gaining access to Russian oil and gas 
energy supplies as diversification of suppliers is described in Japan’s energy policy 
(Kong & Ku, 2015). Under the framework of a multilayered energy supply system, 
Maxie & Masuda (2017) underline that growing U.S LNG exports can give an 
alternative way to Japan’s energy supply and security, as Japan is a member of Japan–
United States Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP). This option can be more profitable 
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than China’s offering because the latter will be regulated and monitored by Russian 
volume of gas exports from Power of Siberia pipeline.  
Regarding South Korea, energy security is based on strengthening energy supply 
stability by expanding overseas resource development (IEA, 2012). The promotion of 
long tern LNG contracts in relation with the diversification of LNG imports thus the 
energy diplomacy towards the change of political behavior of North Korea are primary 
South Korea’s priorities (Kong & Ku, 2015). South Korea is a major energy consumer 
and importer. Keun-Wook Paik (2018) assumes that, as the gas sector is very 
important for potential cooperation between Russia and South Korea, the suggested 
Russia - DPRK - ROK (R-D-R) gas pipeline to the Korean Peninsula will allow Russia to 
diversify its buyer target group in Northeast Asia. Especially in the case of Korean 
peninsula, Salomon (2018) estimates that as piped gas is more economical at this 
moment than LNG, the possibility of a trans-Korea underwater or not pipeline 
connected to the expansion of Russian pipeline Power of Siberia would reshape totally 
the region. As Russia is on the run to diversify its markets, Japan and South Korea will 
continue to remain the main energy importers while North Korea covers its own needs 
by coal. Upon World Energy Council head David Younghoon Kim, the possibility that 
Power of Siberia enables an unprecedented energy net linking the economic interests 
and forming a common market of all key regional players remains still under question 
(Salmon, 2018). Both Russian Far East and Siberia are characterized by abundant 
natural resources so the gateway for Korea to the Eurasian continent through Power 
of Siberia natural gas pipeline represents a significant key to clean energy transition 
of whole geographical complex (Kong & Ku, 2015). 
Upon Sun (2015), energy security for China involves acquisition of energy resources 
and effective energy usage. Consequently, China, by implementing intense energy 
diplomacy to diversify its imports, is interested in reducing energy dependence from 
the Middle East through Straits of Malacca by reason of energy supply vulnerability 
from transport of energy resources via sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Russia’s 
willingness to control supply chain of gas and to diversify regional customers beyond 
Chinese market intends to ensure reliable operations and predictable development of 
the energy infrastructure plus the coverage on time of international export contracts 
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for energy supply and the ambition to become a global energy supplier (Ministry of 
Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010). Northeast Asia is the window to the Asia- 
Paciﬁc region for Russia, thus the Korean peninsula is the key and the decisive factor 
of success to Northeast Asia (Zakharova, 2016). 
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2. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis  
 
In this chapter, theoretical background is presented upon which Systemic Geopolitical 
Analysis is applied to Power of Siberia, accompanied by research restrictions.   
2.1 Theoretical background 
 
According to Mazis (2012, pp. 331-337) (2002, pp. 43-44), the epistemological 
background of geopolitics is Geography and especially the domain of Economic 
Geography that  
1. Investigates the human economic activity and intervention in the geographical 
area 
2. Explores the birth and evolution of economic spaces across the globe 
3. Investigates interactions and correlations between economic spaces. 
Mazis (2012, pp. 331-377) (2002, pp. 43-44) gives the definition of geopolitics as the 
geographic analytical method that studies, predicts and describes the reallocation of 
power in the planet between independent and distinct international, national or ethic 
actors.   
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis upon Mazis (2012, pp. 331-377) (2002, pp. 43-44) 
belongs to neo-positivism movement. In this framework, science is the outcome of 
valid knowledge when it comes from empirical, observable and measurable data, so 
as to develop assumptions, create interpretive mechanisms and form algorithms that 
can be forecasted. Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, as the main representatives of neo-
positivism movement, clarify that it is not possible to provide an epistemological 
method without possessing a forecasting ability that can develop the necessary 
conditions of contradiction and rejection. Lakatos claims that science is not a bouquet 
of single separate theories but a composition of theories that are joined to a common 
core. His scientific estimation of the proper approach of irregularities (positive-
negative heuristic, protective belt) with clear guidelines concerning the best approach 
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of the empirical contrasting examples facilitates the continuing of a research program 
as long as it produces new empirical data. 
Scientific research programs that have been developed by Lakatos are characterized 
by the following principal statements:  
• The basic unit for evaluation should be research program (a sequence of 
theories with noticeable continuance) rather than individual theories 
• The success of a research program depends on whether this leads to a 
progressive shift of problems and unsuccessful if it leads to degeneration.  
• A research program never solves all issues and it is vital to evaluate a series of 
interrelated theories.  
In Figure 2 are presented the main elements that compose a scientific research 
program which are: 
A. The hard core representing the fundamental assumptions of theory thus 
researchers are not allowed to reject them 
B. The negative heuristic which reflects the procedure that a researcher should 
avoid. If there is a change, then a new research scientific program is created 
C. The positive heuristic reproducing a set of suggestions and tips like predictions 
that mentor the researcher and finally 
D. The protective belt of the auxiliary proposals/ hypotheses that empowers the 
latter to be controlled, adapted and replaced when new empirical data arise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic conceptualization of scientific research program upon Lakatos 
(Sanderson, 2003) 
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The main assumptions regarding hard core as Mazis (2012, pp. 364-368) states are the 
following: 
✓ All the features of the geographical complex sub-scales are measurable or can 
be converted to measurable  
✓ The international actors of the international system have a common systemic 
relationship.  
Moreover, the main assumptions regarding protective belt according to Mazis (2012, 
pp. 364-368) are listed below: 
✓ Power analysis includes four fundamental pillars (defense/security, economy, 
politics, culture/information) which are determined by geopolitical indicators. 
✓ International poles of power are the constitutional structural units of an 
international and continually changing unstable system. 
✓ International poles of power represent social behavior or behavior of decision-
makers factors and they can represent states or international institutions that 
are characterized by a homogeneous action in the international system with 
respect to their systemic function. 
✓ Developed concepts of primary, secondary and tertiary spaces and their 
synthesis. 
✓ Systemic geopolitical analysis intends to construct a prognosticative model of 
power redistribution trends.   
Table 1 presents the basic terminology of the systemic geopolitical analysis used by 
the researcher, as Δωματιώτη (2018) does, and in Table 2 the steps followed by the 
researcher in systemic geopolitical analysis are presented with brief explanation. 
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Table 1: Basic terminology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis (Μάζης, 2012) 
Geopolitical factor It provokes the redistribution of power in the geopolitical 
system/complex under study and affects specific geopolitical 
indicators of each geopolitical pillar. 
Geographical space Primary, secondary and tertiary geographical space. 
Geopolitical system The exact sum of the territorial units that compose the 
geopolitical subsystem.  
Geopolitical Complex The broader geographic unit of the geopolitical system. 
Geopolitical Indicator The quantification of the subject under study and the numeric 
result that describes the redistribution of power in the 
Geopolitical System/ Complex. 
Geopolitical Pillars of Power The four pillars (defense/security, economy, politics, 
culture/information) that determine its power and its 
distribution in the studied complex 
Geopolitical Super-system The poles of international power that influence the action of 
geopolitical factors inside the subsystems 
Geopolitical Sub-system The homogeneous, in terms of action and function of a 
geopolitical factor, territorial unit 
 
Table 2: Steps of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis (Μάζης, 2012) 
St
ep
s 
o
f 
Sy
st
em
ic
 G
eo
p
o
lit
ic
a
l 
A
n
al
ys
is
  
Steps Brief Explanation 
1 
Location on the map of the geographical complex. Recognition of geopolitical 
factor and division of the geographical complex into sub-systems and supra-
systems. Definition of the type of geographical space related to research. 
2 Definition of geopolitical pillars of power. 
3 Selection of more significant simple or complex geopolitical indicators.   
4 Synthesis of a comparative presentation or use of simple and complex 
quantitative tools in data processing. 
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5 Formation of geopolitical model of redistribution of power from the results of 
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. Geopolitical model represents the starting 
point of geostrategic synthesis / proposals. 
 
The selected method for the analysis of impact of Power of Siberia in the geographical 
complex of Northeast Asia is Systemic Geopolitical Analysis where the researcher has 
the possibility to:  
1. Reject the subjective and vague presentation of geopolitical events 
2. Examine in depth the selected topic for analysis and exclusively on three scales 
(System/Complex, Sub-system, Super-system) 
3. Be in position to retrieve themes or conditions that are strongly related to the 
topic under analysis 
4. Interpret better and in detail the geostrategic dimension at sub-system level 
5. Analyze the whole view of international system and of its pillars and 
6. Compose a successful prediction and a geostrategic composition with the 
strongest possible conclusions and suggestions (Δωματιώτη, 2018). 
 
2.2 Systemic Geopolitical Analysis on Power of Siberia  
 
Power of Siberia as it was stated before, consists a megaproject of constructing a new 
and direct access of exported Russian natural gas from fields in Eastern Siberia to 
China up to 38 bcm/y, so as to be used in the future as a baseload option for China, 
meaning that the estimated LNG imports could be alternated post 2020 (The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, 2018). Recent development on Power of Siberia gas 
pipeline, as a part of Gazprom’s Eastern Gas Program, is the construction of almost 
95.5 % of the pipeline length plus the installation of 127 producing gas wells 
at the Chayandinskoye field and the linchpin of the Yakutia gas production center. The 
Amur Gas Processing Plant (GPP) near the city of Svobodny, will be the largest plant 
in Russia and one of the biggest in the world. It will serve as an essential link in the 
process chain of natural gas supplies to China via the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. 
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First delivery of gas in Chinese market is expected on December 2019 (Gazprom, 
2018).  
The proposed research questions of current dissertation are: 
1. How the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline affects the economy of the states of 
geopolitical complex of Northeast Asia? 
2. To what degree the Power of Siberia pipeline is going to affect the energy security 
of geopolitical complex of Northeast Asia? 
3. How this mega infrastructure is involved as a tool of politics concerning energy 
diplomacy of the states of the geopolitical complex of Northeast Asia and the role of 
politics in the development and viability of Power of Siberia? 
The developed geopolitical complex includes seven (7) countries which are listed next 
and chosen by implementing the cartography tool of world map by observing the 
itinerary of Power of Siberia gas pipeline (Figure 3). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Power of Siberia pipeline in Northeast Asia (Source: Gazprom) 
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Russia (Russian Federation), China (People’s Republic of China, PRC), Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Japan, North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) and 
South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK).  
Especially, the geopolitical system of current research is identical to geographical 
complex thus it includes the following geographical units: 
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Japan, North Korea (Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK).  
As POS gas pipeline main objective is the transport of hydrocarbon (natural gas) from 
Russia to China these two countries are indispensable members of geopolitical 
system. North and South Korea have been selected as a result of an ongoing discussion 
about a future trans-Korea gas pipeline project that is linked to Vladivostok so it can 
be considered as a future expansion of POS (Figure 4). Japan, as a major importer of 
energy resources is affected by the construction of POS in terms of changing its energy 
security orientation. Finally, Kazakhstan and Mongolia as neighbors have been 
selected because energy security applies to transit option for Mongolia and security 
of demand for Kazakhstan, as the second exporter country of geopolitical system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Proposals on future trans-Korea natural gas pipeline peninsula (Kye-wan, 2018) 
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Power of Siberia pipeline of hydrocarbon (natural gas) consists the geopolitical factor 
of current dissertation.  
Geopolitical super-systems that influence the geopolitical system are four (4): 
• Russia, as the leading producer country in the geographical complex of 
Northeast Asia with the larger natural deposits of hydrocarbons and strategic 
turn to East after Ukrainian crisis occurred in 2013. 
• USA, firstly as a newcomer dynamic exporter of shale gas and LNG cargos via 
sea and secondly as a significant player affecting the geopolitical complex of 
Northeast Asia as Donald Trump’s foreign affair political pressure imposed on 
China about the denuclearization of North Korea is in progress.  
• Japan, as the world’s largest importer of LNG mostly characterized by long-
term contracts of LNG buying and selling agreements. The possibility of 
importing a stable quantity of Russian natural gas via Power of Siberia pipeline 
in combination with POS future expansion via Khabarovsk to Vladivostok and 
furthermore to Korean peninsula can affect firstly Japan’s future energy 
security scheme and secondly the equilibrium between LNG long term 
contracts from Russia versus third exporter countries, such as Australia and 
USA, by importing natural gas from POS converted to LNG via Vladivostok or a 
future hub established in South Korea that finally gives the opportunity to 
avoid long distance cargos of LNG from outside Northeast Asia territory. 
• China, as the biggest world consumer of energy thus energy security in terms 
of acquisition, usage, demand and supply forms an urgent priority. 
Geopolitical sub-systems chosen are four (4) and are presented next: 
G1: China – N. Korea – S. Korea, as China with its extension (Korean peninsula) form a 
separate dynamic mixture of energy strategies characterized mainly by security of 
supply.  
G2: Japan, as it is isolated from other countries of geographical complex of Northeast 
Asia and energy security and supply after Fukushima’s nuclear accident has been 
completely changed. 
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G3: Russia – China, as the former and the later signed the agreement about the 
construction of geopolitical factor (POS) and they are the giant players of region, China 
as energy importer and Russia as energy exporter.  
G4: Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China, as neighbor states Kazakhstan and 
Mongolia with power giants of the Northeast Asia, China and Russia, form a multi-
dynamic system with connections to the West Asia.  
The geopolitical Pillars of Power that have been chosen for the current dissertation 
among defense/security, economy, politics and culture/information are two (2): 
1. Economy and  
2. Politics  
Economy has been chosen as the first geopolitical pillar of Power considering that 
natural hydrocarbons plus available and alternative ways of transporting natural 
resources like natural gas between countries of Northeast Asia affect energy security 
of countries of geopolitical complex. This parameter is of primary importance for the 
economic development and the amelioration of GDP of geographical complex of 
Northeast Asia where rise of energy demand is outstanding.  
Politics is selected as second geopolitical pillar taking under consideration that political 
decisions, followed by policy documents regarding energy demand, supply and 
security, Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) between undertakings and states, 
energy diplomacy regarding the megaproject of Power of Siberia constitute a decisive 
factor of success and viability of POS in combination with the interrelationships 
between the states that form the geographical complex of North East Asia. 
Geopolitical indicators that are used in order to define the reallocation of power are 
categorized as follows:  
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Geopolitical Pillar of Economy 
❖ The capacity of POS (bcm/year) divided by natural gas balance of trade 
(bcm/year) of sub-system as a composite factor of energy security as per 
natural gas. Symbol representing first geopolitical indicator is named as ENG. 
❖ The capacity of POS (ktoe) divided by Total Primary Energy Supply TPES (ktoe) 
of sub-system as a composite factor of energy security effect to total energy 
supply and economy. Symbol representing second geopolitical indicator is 
ETPES. 
❖ The capacity of POS (ktoe) divided by Total Final Consumption TFC (ktoe) of 
sub-system as a composite factor of energy security reflecting lifecycle of 
economy. Third geopolitical indicator of economy is symbolized with ETFC. 
 
Geopolitical Pillar of Politics 
❖ The sum of policy documents, agreements (bilateral, trilateral), Memorandum 
of Understanding, retrieved from official sources of countries related directly 
or indirectly to Power of Siberia gas pipeline megaproject. Geopolitical 
indicator of politics is represented with the symbol P. 
 
 
2.3 Research restrictions 
 
Current research is characterized by interdisciplinarity as a result of handling both 
financial data and documents related to energy policy and politics. Information 
sources from where data, information and elements have been retrieved, are mainly 
taken from open sources published papers, electronic journals, reports, books, 
statistical reviews in a time horizon of 8 years (from 2012 to January 2019). Especially 
for the last three years (2017-2019) it was difficult to get information from latest 
articles available to scholars which are going to be published on the foregoing. Also, 
what is revealed from the procedure of finding data is that there is lack of information 
for countries of Northeast Asia about the future influence of Power of Siberia in 
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countries of Korean peninsula and almost none information in the case of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macao.  
For the forthcoming analysis of geopolitical system, it is useful to underline the 
peculiarity that occurs. As Δωματιώτη (2018) states, the classical super- system poles 
representing states are elements of the complex under analysis. That means that 
states Russian Federation, China and Japan which usually form super - systemic actors 
of other complexes, in this thesis can be used as elements of the complex under 
analysis. Consequently, it is correct under methodological aspect for the states that 
form the geopolitical complex to belong to super-system.  
Data retrieved for the calculation of geopolitical factors of economy have been taken 
from three (3) electronic databases available on web, International Energy Agency 
(IEA), British Petroleum Statistical Review (BP) and Enerdata energy intelligence and 
consulting data office. Time horizon of data retrieved had been chosen to be six (6) 
years (from 2012 to 2017), just after Fukushima’s nuclear accident in 2011 that 
affected Japan’s energy security scheme afterwards. Especially for year 2017 there 
were not available data from IEA database for both geopolitical indicators of economy 
ENG and ETPES, so the method of mean value for the other databases (BP, Enerdata) 
has been selected in combination with the method of weighted moving average.  
In the case of Mongolia and N. Korea, due to lack of available data from BP Statistical 
review and Enerdata databases, only data set from IEA have been taken under 
consideration to calculate geopolitical indicator of economy TFC. Also, in the case of 
Kazakhstan data about gas balance trade from BP Statistical Review are not existed.  
Another difficulty is that the time horizon of data set taken from data bases is not the 
same so average values were calculated differently for year 2017. Method of weighted 
moving average has been used to forecast gas balance trade and TPES for 2018. The 
procedure of set of calculations for geopolitical indicators was held to MS Office Excel 
program. 
For the evaluation and calculation of geopolitical indicators of economy described 
next, mean values of time period from 2012 to 2020 are used so as to describe the 
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tendency regarding evolution of gas balance trade, total primary energy supply TPES 
and total final consumption TFC for each sub-system. Moreover, a projection of 
geopolitical factors ENG, ETPES and ETFC for year 2020 using the method of weighted 
moving average is followed to allocate the reallocation of power of POS regarding 
economy on the foregoing. Also, the researcher assumes that the effect of 
externalities as oil price, GDP growth on calculated data and forecasts executed 
remain neutral. The selection of weighted factors later on for economy has been made 
under assumption that NG interaction to economy is weighted by on one hand side 
implementing indicators related to gas balance trade (imports-exports) as to focus 
primarily on NG as POS forms the geopolitical factor of current thesis and on the other 
hand by implementing indicators describing overall supply and demand from all 
sources of energy for every sub-system as to foresee the effect on economy. For the 
calculation of composite indicator of economy, weighting factors chosen for ENG, 
ETPES and ETFC have been weighted equivalently. 
Concerning geopolitical factor of Politics, in the case of Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea and of China it was not possible to retrieve information about politics (policy 
documents, agreements) from official sites of ministries such as Ministry of Energy 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to limited access and availability of documents 
sources information. Additionally, what is found about bilateral or trilateral 
agreements and signed MoUs is registered separately for each sub-system and 
uniquely. For example, where two members have signed a bilateral agreement and 
belong to the same sub-system, bilateral agreement’s record is registered as one (1). 
Finally, the researcher makes the assumption that economic and political impacts of 
operation and future expansion of POS are of the same importance and weightiness 
when composite indicator is calculated.  
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3. Analysis  
 
3.1 Geopolitical indicator ENG 
 
Geopolitical indicator ENG represents the ratio of volume of Power of Siberia to the 
average gas balance of trade of each sub-system for the period 2012-2020. Natural 
gas balance of trade is considered as the sum of gas imports minus gas exports. Data 
for the calculation have been taken from 3 databases (IEA, BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy and Enerdata Energy Statistical Yearbook) for a time horizon of 6 years 
(2012-2017) after Fukushima’s nuclear accident occurred in 2011. As last update of 
databases of Enerdata and BP reach until the year 2017, in order to estimate gas 
balance trade for 2018 the method of weighted moving average for a period of 6 years 
was followed. The applied weighted factors that were used are presented in Table 3. 
Table 4 depicts the calculated average natural gas balance trade (in bcm) of each 
country of geographical system, after the introduction and recalculation of data taken 
from the databases referred. Minus (-) depicts that imports are lower than exports. 
Table 3: Weighted factors 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gravity Factor  0,35 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,1 0,1 
 
Table 4: Natural Gas Balance of trade for time period 2012-2018 (bcm) 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Russia -184,1 -202,7 -180,8 -192,4 -203,0 -216,6 -200,9 
China  37,9 48,3 55,5 57,2 70,1 90,1 68,34 
Japan 124,0 122,1 124,7 117,8 117,5 115,4 117,1 
Mongolia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Kazakhstan -4,3 -3,4 -4,3 -5,1 -5,9 -6,1 -9,2 
N.Korea 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
S.Korea 33,6 37,3 34,1 30,7 31,0 24,8 48,2 
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3.1.1 Sub-system G1: China – N. Korea – S. Korea 
 
Natural Gas balance of trade for sub-system G1 in 2012 is equal to: 
NG1-2012 = NG China 2012 + NG N. Korea 2012+ NG S. Korea 2012 = 37,9 + 0,0 + 33,6 = 71,5 bcm/year 
Forecast for year 2019 is calculated via method of weighted moving average:  
NG1-2019 = 0,35*(NG1-2018) + 0,20*(NG1-2017) + 0,15*(NG1-2016) + 0,1*(NG1-2015) + 
0,1*(NG1-2014) + 0,1*(NG1-2013), then  
NG1-2019 = 0,35*(116,6) + 0,20*(114,9) + 0,15*(101,1) + 0,1*(87,8) + 0,1*(89,7) + 
0,1*(85,6) = 105,3 bcm/year. 
For year 2020, NG1-2020 = 105,3 bcm /year 
The ratio Volume of POS (bcm) / NG1-2020 (bcm) represents the geopolitical indicator 
ENG1-2020.  
ENG1-2020 = 38 (bcm) / NG1-2020 = 38/105,3 = 0,36  
Average natural gas balance of trade NGAVERAGE 1 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
NGAVERAGE 1 = (NG1-2012 + … + NG1-2020)/9 = 97, 5 
Ratio Volume of POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 1 (bcm) represents the geopolitical indicator 
ENG1. Therefore 
ENG1 = POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 1= 38/97,5= 0,39 
 
3.1.2 Sub-system G2: Japan  
 
Natural Gas balance of trade for sub-system G2 in 2012 is equal to: 
NG2-2012 = NG Japan 2012 = 124 bcm/year and forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
NG2-2019 = 118,2 bcm/year 
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NG2-2020 = 118,1 bcm/year, therefore 
ENG2-2020= 38/118,1 = 0,32  
Average natural gas balance of trade NGAVERAGE 2 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
NGAVERAGE 2 = (NG2-2012 + … + NG2-2020)/9 = 119,4 bcm 
As above,  
Volume of POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 2 (bcm) =ENG2. Therefore 
ENG2 = POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 2 = 38/119,4 = 0,32 
 
3.1.3 Sub-system G3: Russia – China 
 
Natural Gas balance of trade for sub-system G3 in 2012 is equal to: 
NG3-2012 = NG Russia 2012 + NG China 2012 = -184,1 +37,9 = -146,2 bcm/year and forecasts for 
years 2019, 2020 are: 
NG3-2019 = -133,1 bcm/year, so 
NG3-2020 = -131,4 bcm/year and ENG3-2020 = 38/ (-131,4) = - 0,29 
Average natural gas balance of trade NGAVERAGE 3 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
NGAVERAGE 3 = (NG3-2012 + … + NG3-2020)/9 = -135.3 bcm 
As previous:  Volume of POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 3 (bcm) = ENG3. Therefore 
ENG3 = POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 3 = 38/ (-138,5) = - 0,28 
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3.1.4 Sub-system G4: Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China 
 
Natural Gas balance of trade for sub-system G4 in 2012 is equal to: 
NG4-2012 = NG Russia 2012 + NG Kazakhstan 2012+ NG Mongolia 2012 + NG China 2012 = -184,1 - 4,3 +0,0 
+37,9 =-150,5 bcm/year and forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
NG4-2019 = -139,7 bcm/year 
NG4-2020 = -138,0 bcm/year thus 
ENG4-2020 = 38 / (-138,0) = -0,28 
Average natural gas balance of trade NGAVERAGE 4 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
NGAVERAGE 4 = (NG4-2012 + … + NG4-2020)/9 = -141,0 bcm 
ENG4 = POS (bcm) / NGAVERAGE 4= 38/ (-141,0) = - 0,27 
Summarizing, in Table 5 are presented the geopolitical indicators ENG of all sub-
systems corresponding for year 2020 when is scheduled the initial operation of the 
Power of Siberia and the average values of ENG for the period 2012-2020 (9 years).  
Table 5: Geopolitical indicators ENG of sub-systems for 2020 and for period 2012-2020 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ENG1-2020  0,36 ENG1  0,39 
ENG2-2020 0,32 ENG2  0,32 
ENG3-2020  -0,29 ENG3  -0,28 
ENG4-2020  -0,28 ENG4  -0,27 
 
To transform above results into a range of newmin and newMax, the Max Min 
normalization method has been applied with main advantage that all the values are 
annealed within certain range. New range values selected is {0,1}.  
𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐴 =
𝑣 −𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
(𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛) + 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 
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new max = 1  
new min = 0 
Normalized geopolitical indicators ENG1-2-3-4 2020 new and average ENG1-2-3-4 new are 
presented in Table 6: 
Table 6: Normalized geopolitical indicators ENG 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ENG1-2020 new 1 ENG1 new 1 
ENG2-2020 new 0,9397 ENG2 new 0,89347 
ENG3-2020 new 0 ENG3 new 0 
ENG4-2020 new 0,0213 ENG4 new 0,01702 
 
3.2 Geopolitical indicator ETPES 
 
Geopolitical indicator ETPES represents the net ratio of volume of POS (in ktoe) to the 
Total Primary Energy Supply TPES (ktoe) of each sub-system. Data for the calculation 
have been taken from 3 databases (IEA, BP Statistical Review of World Energy and 
Enerdata Energy Statistical Yearbook) for a time horizon of 6 years (2012-2017). In the 
case of Mongolia and N. Korea data available were on database of IEA for the period 
2011-2016. As last update of databases of Enerdata and BP reach until 2017, in order 
to estimate Total Primary Energy Supply for years 2018, 2019 and 2020 the method of 
weighted moving average for a period of 6 years was followed just like for the 
calculation of TPES for Mongolia and N. Korea for year 2017. The applied gravity 
factors that are used are presented in Table 7. Table 8 depicts average total primary 
energy supply (in ktoe) of each country of geographical system and sub-systems. 
 
Table 7: Weighted factors 
Year 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 
Gravity Factor  0,35 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,1 0,1 
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Table 8: Average TPES for countries and sub-systems (ktoe) 
 
Values for Kazakhstan and Mongolia for year 2017 have been calculated with weighted 
mean value equation for years 2011-2016, as only one value from IEA database was 
available. 
3.2.1 Sub-system G1: China – N. Korea – S. Korea 
 
TPES for sub-system G1 in 2012 is equal to: 
TPES1-2012 = TPES China 2012 + TPES N. Korea 2012+ TPES S. Korea 2012 = 2.612.840,2 + 11.489 + 
270.103,7= 3.094.432,8 ktoe 
Forecast of TPES for year 2018 is calculated via method of weighted moving average:  
TPES1-2018 = 0,35*(TPES1-2017) + 0,20*(TPES1-2016) + 0,15*(TPES1-2015) + 0,1*(TPES1-2014) + 
0,1*(TPES1-2013) + 0,1*(TPES1-2012), so 
TPES1-2018 = 0,35*(3.423.621,9) + 0,20*(3.304.367,6) + 0,15*(3.280.221,1) + 
0,1*(3.248.496,1) + 0,1*(3.188.637,7) + 0,1*(3.094.432,8) = 3.304.331 ktoe. Also, for 
following years 2019 and 2020 TPES results are next: 
TPES1-2019 = 3.308.630,8 ktoe 
TPES1-2020 = 3.315.738,8 ktoe 
Geopolitical indicator ETPES is represented by the ratio 
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 Volume of POS (ktoe) / TPES1-2020 (ktoe)  
which reveals the participation of POS in total primary energy supply regarding energy 
security. Volume of Power of Siberia (expressed in bcm) is converted to (ktoe). The 
factor for the conversion has been retrieved from IEA database which is: 
1 bcm = 859,8452 ktoe (IEA database), therefore 
Volume of POS = 38 bcm = 38*859,8452 = 32.674,12 ktoe.  
Finally, 
ETPES1-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TPES1-2020 (ktoe) = 32.674,12 / 3.315.738,8 = 
0,009854 
Average total primary energy supply TPESAVERAGE 1 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
TPESAVERAGE 1 = (TPES3-2012 + … + TPES3-2020)/9 = 3.274.275,3 ktoe 
Volume of POS divides by TPESAVERAGE 1 represents the geopolitical indicator ENG1. 
Therefore 
ETPES1 = POS (ktoe) / TPESAVERAGE 1 = 32.674,12/3.274.275,3 = 0,009979 
 
3.2.2 Sub-system G2: Japan  
 
TPES for sub-system G2 in 2012 is equal to: 
TPES2-2012 = TPES Japan 2012 = 459.331,2 ktoe and forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
TPES2-2019 = 443.064,8 ktoe 
TPES2-2020 = 441.802,2 ktoe, therefore  
ETPES2-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TPES2-2020 (ktoe) = 32.674,12 / 441.802,2 = 0,073956 
 35 
 
Average total primary energy supply TPESAVERAGE 2 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
TPESAVERAGE 2 = (TPES2-2012 + … + TPES2-2020)/9 = 445.127,5 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TPESAVERAGE 2 represents the geopolitical indicator ETPES2 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
ETPES2= POS (ktoe) / TPESAVERAGE 2 = 32.674,12/445.127,5 = 0,073404 
 
3.2.3 Sub-system G3: Russia – China 
 
TPES for sub-system G3 in 2012 is equal to: 
TPES3-2012 = TPES Russia 2012 + TPES China 2012 = 724.682,5 + 2.812.840,2 = 3.537.522,6 ktoe 
and forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
TPES3-2019 = 3.727.706,6 ktoe, so 
TPES3-2020 = 3.734.149,6 ktoe therefore  
ETPES3-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TPES3-2020 (ktoe) = 32.674,12 / 3.734.149,6 = 0,00875  
Average total primary energy supply TPESAVERAGE 3 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
TPESAVERAGE 3 = (TPES3-2012 + … + TPES3-2020)/9 = 3.696.289,4 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TPESAVERAGE 3 represents the geopolitical indicator ETPES3 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
ETPES3= POS (ktoe) / TPESAVERAGE 3 = 32.674,12/445.127,5 = 0,00884 
 
3.2.4 Sub-system G4: Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China 
 
TPES for sub-system G4 in 2012 is equal to: 
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TPES4-2012 = TPES Russia 2012 + TPES Kazakhstan 2012 + TPES Mongolia 2012 + TPES China 2012 = 
724.682,5 +70.140,6 + 4.482,0 + 2.812.840,2 = 3.612.145,3 ktoe. Forecasts for years 
2019, 2020 are: 
TPES4-2019 = 3.806.402,9 ktoe 
TPES4-2020 = 3.812.669,2 ktoe so 
ETPES4-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TPES4-2020 (ktoe) = 32.674,12 / 3.812.669,2 = 0,00857 
Average total primary energy supply TPESAVERAGE 4 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
TPESAVERAGE 4 = (TPES4-2012 + … + TPES4-2020)/9 = 3.774.571,4 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TPESAVERAGE 4 represents the geopolitical indicator ETPES4 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
 ETPES4= POS (ktoe) / TPESAVERAGE 4= 32.674,12/3.774.571,4 = 0,008656 
Summarizing, in Table 9 are presented the geopolitical indicators ETPES of all sub-
systems corresponding for year 2020 when is scheduled the initial operation of the 
Power of Siberia and the average values of ETPES for the period 2012-2020.  
Table 9: Geopolitical indicators ETPES of sub-systems for 2020 and for period 2012-2020 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ETPES1-2020  0,009854 ETPES1  0,009979 
ETPES2-2020 0,073956 ETPES2  0,073404 
ETPES3-2020  0,00875 ETPES3  0,00884 
ETPES4-2020  0,00857 ETPES4  0,008656 
 
Max Min normalization method has been applied to evaluate the results. New range 
values selected is {0,1}. Table 10 presents normalized geopolitical indicators ETPES1-2-
3-4 2020 new and average ETPES1-2-3-4 new. 
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Table 10: Normalized Geopolitical indicators ETPES 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ETPES1-2020 new 0,02 ETPES1 new 0,02 
ETPES2-2020 new 1 ETPES2 new 1 
ETPES3-2020 new 0,003 ETPES3 new 0,003 
ETPES4-2020 new 0 ETPES4 new 0 
 
 
3.3 Geopolitical indicator ETFC 
 
Geopolitical indicator ETFC represents the net ratio of volume of POS (in ktoe) to the 
Total Final Consumption TFC (in ktoe) of each sub-system. Data have been taken from 
3 databases (IEA, BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Enerdata Energy Statistical 
Yearbook) for a time horizon of 6 years (2012-2017). In the case of Mongolia and N. 
Korea data available were on database of IEA for the period 2011-2016. As last update 
of databases of Enerdata and BP reach until 2017, in order to estimate Total Final 
Consumption for years 2018, 2019 and 2020 the method of weighted moving average 
for a period of 6 years was followed just as was done for ETPES with the same applied 
weighting factors that are presented in Table 11. Table 12 depicts average Total Final 
Consumption TFC (in ktoe) of each country of geographical system and of all sub-
systems. 
Table 11: Weighted factors 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gravity Factor  0,35 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,1 0,1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
Table 12: Average TFC for countries and sub-systems  
 
 
3.3.1 Sub-system G1: China – N. Korea – S. Korea 
 
TFC for sub-system G1 in 2012 is equal to: 
TFC1-2012 = TFC China 2012 + TFC N. Korea 2012 + TFC S. Korea 2012 = 1.593.675,8 + 9.808 + 237.516 
= 1.840.999,8 ktoe 
Forecast of TFC for year 2018 is calculated via method of weighted moving average:  
TFC1-2018 = 0,35*(TFC1-2017) + 0,20*(TFC1-2016) + 0,15*(TFC1-2015) + 0,1*(TFC1-2014) + 
0,1*(TFC1-2013) + 0,1*(TFC1-2012), so 
TFC1-2018 = 0,35*(1.976.307,1) + 0,20*(1.992.886,6) + 0,15*(1.962.800,9) + 
0,1*(1.937.685,4) + 0,1*(1.897.155,8) + 0,1*(1.840.999,8) = 1.952.289,1 ktoe. For 
following years 2019 and 2020 ETFC results are next: 
TFC1-2019 = 1.957.259,8 ktoe 
TFC1-2020 = 1.961.282,1 ktoe 
Geopolitical indicator ETFC is represented by the ratio 
Volume of POS (ktoe) / TFC1-2020 (ktoe)  
Volume of Power of Siberia (expressed in bcm) is converted to ktoe by the following 
factor retrieved from IEA database which is: 
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1 bcm = 859,8452 ktoe (IEA database), therefore 
Volume of POS = 38 bcm = 38*859,8452 = 32.674,12 ktoe.  
Finally, 
ETFC1-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TFC1-2020 (ktoe) = 0,01666 
Average total primary energy supply TFCAVERAGE 1 for the whole time period 2012-2020 
is: 
TFCAVERAGE 1 = (TFC3-2012 + … + TFC3-2020)/9 = 1.924.074,1ktoe 
Volume of POS divides by TFCAVERAGE 1 represents the geopolitical indicator ETFC1. 
Therefore 
ETFC1 = POS (ktoe) / TFCAVERAGE 1 = 0,016824 
 
3.3.2 Sub-system G2: Japan 
 
TFC for sub-system G2 in 2012 is equal to: 
TFC2-2012 = TFC Japan 2012 = 293.247,3 ktoe and forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
TFC2-2019 = 281.035,6ktoe 
TFC2-2020 = 280.170 ktoe, therefore  
ETFC2-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TFC2-2020 (ktoe) = 0,116622 
Average total final consumption TFCAVERAGE 2 for the whole time period 2012-2020 is: 
TFCAVERAGE 2 = (TFC2-2012 + … + TFC2-2020)/9 = 283.365,2 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TFCAVERAGE 2 represents the geopolitical indicator ETFC2 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
ETFC2= POS (ktoe) / TFCAVERAGE 2 = 0,115307 
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3.3.3 Sub-system G3: Russia - China 
 
TFC for sub-system G3 in 2012 is equal to: 
TFC3-2012 = TFC Russia 2012 + TFC China 2012 = 627.715,5 + 1.593.675,8 = 2.221.391,3 ktoe and 
forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
TFC3-2019 = 2.340.117,9 ktoe and TFC3-2020 = 2.344.668,6 ktoe therefore  
ETFC3-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TFC3-2020 (ktoe) = 0,013935  
TFCAVERAGE 3 for the whole time period 2012-2020 is: 
TFCAVERAGE 3 = (TFC3-2012 + … + TFC3-2020)/9 = 2.321.408,3 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TFCAVERAGE 3 represents the geopolitical indicator ETFC3 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
ETFC3= POS (ktoe) / TFCAVERAGE 3 = 0,014075 
 
3.3.4 Sub-system G4: Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China 
 
TFC for sub-system G4 in 2012 is equal to: 
TFC4-2012 = TFC Russia 2012 + TFC Kazakhstan 2012 + TFC Mongolia 2012 + TFC China 2012 = 627.715,5 
42.830,8 + 3.252 + 1.593.675,8 = 2.267.474,1 ktoe. Forecasts for years 2019, 2020 are: 
TFC4-2019 = 2.388.759,3 ktoe and TFC4-2020 = 2.393.182,7 ktoe so 
ETFC4-2020 = Volume POS (ktoe) / TPES4-2020 (ktoe) = 0,013653 
TFCAVERAGE 4 for the whole time period 2012-2020 is: 
TFCAVERAGE 4 = (TFC4-2012 + … + TFC4-2020)/9 = 2.369.540,6 ktoe 
Volume of POS divided by TFCAVERAGE 4 represents the geopolitical indicator ETFC4 for 
period 2012-2020, therefore 
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 ETFC4= POS (ktoe) / TFCAVERAGE 4= 0,013789 
Summarizing, in Table 13 are presented the geopolitical indicators ETFC of all sub-
systems corresponding for year 2020 when is scheduled the initial operation of the 
Power of Siberia and the average values of ETFC for the period 2012-2020.  
Table 13: Geopolitical indicators ETFC of sub-systems for 2020 and for period 2012-2020 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ETFC1-2020  0,01666 ETFC1  0,016824 
ETFC2-2020  0,116622 ETFC2  0,115307 
ETFC3-2020  0,013935 ETFC3  0,014075 
ETFC4-2020  0,013653 ETFC4  0,013789 
 
Max Min normalization method has been applied to evaluate the results. New range 
values selected is {0,1}. Table 14 presents normalized geopolitical indicators ETFC1-2-3-
4 2020 new and average ETFC1-2-3-4 new. 
Table 14: Normalized Geopolitical indicators ETFC 
Sub-systems  Value Sub-systems  Value 
ETFC1-2020 new 0,029 ETFC1 new 0,03 
ETFC2-2020 new 1 ETFC2 new 1 
ETFC3-2020 new 0,003 ETFC3 new 0,003 
ETFC4-2020 new 0 ETFC4 new 0 
 
 
3.4 Geopolitical indicator of politics P 
 
As it was stated in paragraph 2.2, geopolitical indicator P represents the sum of policy 
documents published from official national sources (Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), agreements signed (bilateral or trilateral) and memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) signed between member states. 
To facilitate the analysis made, Table 15 presents the total number of policy 
documents revealed from Ministries of Energy, Foreign Affairs of each country.  
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Table 15: Policy documents per country 
 Ministry of Energy 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Sum of Policy 
Documents 
Russia 2 0 2 
China 3 0 3 
Mongolia  0 1 1 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 
Japan 2 1 3 
N. Korea 0 0 0 
S. Korea 0 3 3 
 
Table 16 and 17 respectively exhibit the distribution of agreements (bilateral-
trilateral) and MoU per country found. Total sum of agreements is 7 and MoU is 5. 
Trilateral agreements and trilateral MoU are marked next with orange color.  
 
Table 16: Agreements (bilateral-trilateral) per country 
 Russia China Mongolia Kazakhstan Japan 
N. 
Korea 
S. 
Korea 
Russia        
China 1,2,3       
Mongolia 6 6      
Kazakhstan  5      
Japan  7      
N. Korea        
S. Korea 4 7      
 
Table 17: MoU per country 
 Russia China Mongolia Kazakhstan Japan 
N. 
Korea 
S. 
Korea 
Russia        
China 1,2       
Mongolia 5 5      
Kazakhstan        
Japan 3       
N. Korea        
S. Korea 4       
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3.4.1 Sub-system G1: China – N. Korea – S. Korea 
 
Geopolitical indicator P1 for Sub-system G1 is the total sum of policy documents, 
common agreements and MoUs as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18: Geopolitical indicator P1 
Sub-system 
G1      
Policy 
documents 
Agreements MoU Sum 
China 3 
1 
0 4 
S. Korea 3 0 4 
N. Korea  0 0  0 0 
P1 6 1 0 7 
 
3.4.2 Sub-system G2: Japan 
 
Geopolitical indicator P2 is the sum of policy documents, common agreements and 
MoUs as shown in Table 19. 
Table 19: Geopolitical indicator P2 
Sub-system 
G2      
Policy 
documents 
Agreements MoU Sum 
Japan 3 1 1 5 
P2 3 1 1 5 
 
3.4.3 Sub-system G3: Russia – China 
 
Geopolitical indicator P3 is the total sum of policy documents, common agreements 
and MoUs as shown in Table 20. 
Table 20: Geopolitical indicator P3 
Sub-system 
G3      
Policy 
documents 
Agreements MoU Sum 
Russia 2 
3 1 2 1 
9 
China 3 10 
P3 5 4 3 12 
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3.4.4 Sub-system G4: Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China 
 
Geopolitical indicator P4 is the total sum of policy documents, common agreements 
and MoUs as shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Geopolitical indicator P4 
Sub-system     
G4 
Policy 
documents 
Agreements MoU Sum 
Russia 2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
10 
China 3 11 
Mongolia 1 0 0 3 
Kazakhstan 0 1* 0 0 0 1 
P4 6 5 4 15 
 
* Bilateral agreement between Kazakhstan and China (registered once) 
 
Max Min normalization method has been applied to evaluate the above results so the 
equation referred in paragraph 3.1.4 is used. New range values selected is {0,1}. 
Finally, Table 22 presents normalized geopolitical indicators P1-2-3-4. 
Max: 15 
Min: 5 
New max: 1 
New min: 0 
Table 22: Normalized geopolitical indicators of politics P 
Sub-systems  
Geopolitical 
Indicators 
Value 
Normalization  
G1 P1 7 0,2 
G2 P2 5 0 
G3 P3 12 0,7 
G4 P4 15 1 
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3.5 Structure of Composite factors of economy and politics  
 
Composite factor E represents the reallocation of power for the geopolitical pylon of 
economy and it is formed by using multiplication weight factors applied for indicators 
ENG, ETPES and ETF. The researcher tries to combine indicator of NG balance of trade 
ENG with the 2 other factors ETPES and ETFC so as to form an overall indicator for the 
economy in order to illustrate the overall effect of POS to energy security and to 
economy of sub-systems. As it is referred previously in developed research 
restrictions, multiplication weighting factors selected are equal to 0,33.  
For sub-system G1 composite factor E1 is equal to: 
E1 = 0,33*ENG1-2020 new + 0,33*ETPES1-2020 new + 0,33*ETFC1-2020 new = 0,33*(1) + 
0,33*(0,02) +0,33*(0,029) = 0,35 
For sub-systems G2, G3 and G4 composite geopolitical indicators of economy are: 
E2 = 0,33*ENG2-2020 new + 0,33*ETPES2-2020 new + 0,33*ETFC2-2020 new = 0,33*(0,94) + 
0,33*(1) +0,33*(1) = 0,980 
E3 = 0,33*ENG3-2020 new + 0,33*ETPES3-2020 new + 0,33*ETFC3-2020 new = 0,33*(0) + 
0,33*(0,003) +0,33*(0,003) = 0,002 
E4 = 0,33*ENG4-2020 new + 0,33*ETPES4-2020 new + 0,33*ETFC4-2020 new = 0,33*(0,02) + 
0,33*(0) +0,33*(0) = 0,007 
Therefore, for individual sub-systems overall indicator E per sub-system is presented 
in Table 23. 
Table 23: Composite indicator E of sub-systems 
Sub-
systems 
Indicator 
E 
Value 
G1 E1 0,350 
G2 E2 0,980 
G3 E3 0,002 
G4 E4 0,007 
 
 46 
 
Synthesis of the aforementioned geopolitical indicators of politics P with composite 
indicator E gives birth to a new overall composite indicator named EP used to describe 
the total effect of POS and the redistribution of power according to Systemic 
Geopolitical Analysis for each sub-system. The researcher here assumes that 
contribution of economy and politics is equal, so: 
EP1 = 0,5*(E1) + 0,5*(P1), thus 
EP1 = 0,5*(0,350) + 0,5*(0,2) = 0,27481 
 
For sub-systems G2, G3 and G4 overall composite indicators are: 
EP2 = 0,5*(0,98) + 0,5*(0) = 0,48996 
EP3 = 0,5*(0,002) + 0,5*(0,7) = 0,35092 
EP4 = 0,5*(0,007) + 0,5*(1) = 0,50354 
 
Finally, in Table 24 are listed the overall composite indicators for aforementioned sub-
systems.   
Table 24: Composite indicator EP  
Sub -
systems 
Indicator 
E 
Value 
Indicator 
P 
Value 
Indicator 
EP 
Value 
G1 E1 0,350 P1 0,2 EP1 0,27481 
G2 E2 0,980 P2 0 EP2 0,48996 
G3 E3 0,002 P3 0,7 EP3 0,35092 
G4 E4 0,007 P4 1 EP4 0,50354 
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4. Geopolitical model  
 
Main characteristics of the geopolitical model based on economy and on politics, as it 
was described in Chapter 3 are presented next. Regarding geopolitical pylon of 
economy, for NG gas balance of trade sub - system G1 which is formed by China, ROK 
and DPRK is more powerful than other sub-systems. Then follow G2, G4 and G3. In the 
case of total primary energy supply (TPES) sub-system G2 (Japan) excels over G1, G3 and 
G4. Concerning total final consumption (TFC) again sub-system G2 Japan dominates 
over G1, G3 and G4. Aggregate view of reallocation of power in geopolitical pylon of 
economy is given by composite indicator E. Sub-system G2 (Japan) dominates over 
other sub-systems, followed by G1, G4 and G3 as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Composite Geopolitical Indicator E 
As per geopolitical pylon of politics, from the comparison of geopolitical indicator of 
politics P, sub-system G4 (Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China) is more powerful 
followed by sub-systems G3, G1 and G2 as it is presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Composite Geopolitical Indicator P 
Finally, comparison’s outcome of composite geopolitical indicator produced from the 
synthesis of geopolitical indicators of economy and politics is presented in Figure 7. 
Sub-system G4 (Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia – China) is the dominant player, 
followed by sub-systems G2, G3 and G1 in geographical complex under study. 
 
Figure 7: Composite Geopolitical Indicator EP 
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5. Geostrategic synthesis 
 
Energy security aim and meaning as it was developed previously diversifies in the 
geographical complex of Northeast Asia not only between separate sub-systems but 
also inside a separate sub-system as it was depicted previously. Dominant sub-system 
of Russia – Kazakhstan – Mongolia - China encompasses a mixture of alternative 
approaches towards energy security. This occurs as China’s energy security approach 
based primarily on security of supply differs from Russian’s policy towards energy 
security whose characteristic is the security of demand. Mongolia efforts to constitute 
a future connection to POS discloses that security of transit comes first. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, security of demand is significant, as Kazakhstan forms the other big 
exporter of NG in the geopolitical system.   
Russia’s pivot and reorientation to the Northeast Asia is accompanied by effective 
energy diplomacy tool that is natural gas reserves. Russia, as member of dominant 
sub-system G4 and main exporter of energy hydrocarbons seeks for security of 
demand regarding energy security approach. As it is depicted from the geopolitical 
model, Russia’s performance on geopolitical pillar of politics related with its neighbor 
states, offers the comparative advantage of applying natural gas exports as an 
effective tool of energy diplomacy. A question to be answered is if Russian gas 
produced and transported by POS is able to withstand LNG growing market share.  
China, among the most intensive economies and the larger importer of NG, sets as 
primary goal the diversification of energy imports. Green transition and goal of energy 
efficiency affect energy security scheme based on security of supply. Upon the 
geopolitical model developed, China in my opinion will be favored of POS operation 
thus redistribution of power gives the possibility to rethink about LNG imports from 
third countries. Lower price of delivered via POS Russian NG and the absorbed sunk 
cost are criteria of avoiding vulnerability for China from importing LNG cargos via 
SLOcs at unstable conditions.  
Mongolia, as it is demonstrated from geopolitical model, is in favor of redistribution 
of power because Mongolia belongs to the dominant sub-system G4. As energy 
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security refers to security of demand and of transit in the case of Mongolia, energy 
diplomacy performed via politics with policy documents, trilateral agreement with 
China and Russia reveals a successful extroversion so POS repercussion is positive.  
Kazakhstan’s energy security concept lies on secured energy demand as it is the 
second exporter of NG in the formed geopolitical system. From the geopolitical model 
Kazakhstan is among the countries where redistribution of power of geopolitical factor 
POS is bigger. As it is an exporter of NG there is already the infrastructure and the 
transmission network that give Kazakhstan the availability to export NG to China. 
Supplementary quantity induced in China’s emerging market concerning energy 
demand can in the future affect security of demand issue for Kazakhstan. Energy 
diplomacy thus a future agreement of new pipeline connection with Russia could 
enable energy cooperation and Kazakhstan’s amelioration of its role in Northeast Asia.  
Japan, as unique member of sub-system G2 and simultaneously as a super-pole of 
geopolitical sub system, is characterized by scarcity of energy resources so energy 
security lies mainly on security of supply.  As it was presented previously, performance 
of Japan in geopolitical indicator of economy is completely different from the 
performance of chosen geopolitical indicator in politics, regarding policy documents, 
agreements and MoUs signed. Redistribution of power upon geopolitical model brings 
Japan in second place. Taking initiatives in political domain and energy diplomacy as 
the perspective of connection to S. Korea via underwater pipeline natural gas or by 
managing long term contracts for cargo of LNG transferred to Japan from Vladivostoc 
or S. Korea via POS could change significantly reallocation of power of POS. 
Korean peninsula forms an interesting field of approach as S. Korea’s mature 
consuming market driven by rise of energy demand is inevitable linked to security of 
supply. In my opinion, South Korea as part of sub-system G1 (China- N. Korea - S. Korea) 
which performs the smallest redistribution of power, should enhance the political 
initiatives in order to manage to ameliorate supply flexibility because its energy 
security is characterized mainly from security of supply. The construction of a future 
Trans-Korean peninsula pipeline as an expansion of POS prospective branch to 
Vladivostoc via Khavbarovsk presupposes the peaceful resolve of border issues with 
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N. Korea. Also, boost of bilateral or trilateral agreements and MoU with N. Korea and 
China accompanied by willingness of China to develop an international network of gas 
supply can increase rapidly diplomatic position and the role of ROK in geographical 
system.   
As per N. Korea which is member of aforementioned sub-system G1, natural gas until 
now does not take part in the energy mixture regarding supply side.  For the moment 
it seems that Power of Siberia impact on North Korea’s energy security is small due to 
its political isolation. Historic summit held on April 2018 between North Korean leader 
Kim Jong Un and South Korea's President Moon Jae could be the initial start on energy 
cooperation of states of Korean peninsula with regards to East Siberia Russian natural 
gas.   
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6. Conclusions  
 
Geographical complex of Northeast Asia is characterized by emerging demand of 
energy. Therefore, the topic of diversification of energy available or the transport of a 
newcomer energy source affects energy security. The construction and operation of a 
natural gas pipeline with starting point Russian East Siberia and finish line China’s 
territory or in the future S. Korea’s coastline can affect Northeast Asia energy security 
by all possible ways: demand, supply and transit, depending also on political decisions 
taken concerning realization of POS. An attempt to describe and foresee the 
redistribution of power has been made taking into consideration economical and 
political factors. Outcome of present dissertation is that China and Russia with their 
neighbor states Kazakhstan and Mongolia are favored after the initial operation of POS 
under the geopolitical indicators that have been introduced by the researcher and 
reallocation of power strengthens them. Also, a geopolitical synthesis was attempted 
to be performed based on the findings of current dissertation. Power of Siberia impact 
on redistribution of power affecting energy security as seen from economic and politic 
aspect strengthens not only the two major energy giants, China as an importer and 
Russia as an exporter, but influences in the end entire Northeast Asia geographical 
complex in terms of energy security and energy diplomacy.  
Suggestions for future research can be the reallocation of power following Systemic 
Geopolitical Analysis by implementing geopolitical indicators related to other 
geopolitical pylons defense/security and information/culture. Operation of POS in 
relation to China’s gas transmission networks and supplementary infrastructure in 
relation to the impact of NG delivery via POS to LNG share and shale gas penetration 
in geographical complex of Northeast Asia forms another field of future research. 
Finally, the development and exploitation of Northeast Asia methane hydrate 
resources discovered from China and Japan compared to POS operation provides 
domain for future research. 
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